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RUMSFELD DOCTRINE: FAILED LEGACY
DEFENSE SECRETARY CAN’T ADMIT HIS POLICIES ARE DISASTROUS
By Richard Walker
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has guaranteed himself a place in military history for advancing a strategy that is now widely viewed as a complete failure.
Known as “the Rumsfeld Doctrine,” the 74-yearold cabinet member’s guiding principle on the battlefield has been to employ fast-moving, lightly armored forces supported by hi-tech weapons and “shock and awe” air power. This may work for standing armies that fight out in the open, but it has proven to be catastrophic when employed against guerrilla fighters, who hide deep within mountain caves or easily dissolve into crowds in urban environments.
Recently, some of Rumsfeld’s harshest critics have argued that he is a captain going down with the ship. This has become increasingly clear because, despite the deepening crises in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rumsfeld continues to claim that his doctrine has succeeded. It is only a matter of time, he says, before everyone else realizes that fact.
On Oct. 7, in an opinion column in a major Washington newspaper, Rumsfeld tried to paint a rosy picture for Afghanistan, stressing that it’s not all bad news. In his view, the country and its people are doing well economically and any setbacks were outweighed by achievements. In particular, he said he was heartened by the opening of a $24 million Coca-Cola plant in the country and the building of 25 courthouses.
Rumsfeld tried to sugarcoat what he had to say, stating that “today can always look worse than yesterday, or even two months ago.” To many, his statement epitomized the silly platitudes he has become famous for in his lunchtime television conferences at the Pentagon.
While ignoring the reality on the ground of fierce fighting and almost daily assassinations, he added: “Building a new nation is never a straight, steady climb upwards.”
Rumsfeld’s unrealistic portrayal of Afghanistan, however, fell on deaf ears, because on the same day it was published, Gen. David Richards, the NATO commander who has taken over security of the country, issued a dire warning that Afghanistan was at 
Any casual observer of Rumsfeld’s opinion piece would be justified in seeing it as a desperate attempt by him to defend his record and to paint a pleasant but bogus picture of the war in Afghanistan in advance of congressional elections. But for Rumsfeld, who is widely viewed in the military as both arrogant and thickheaded, it is about more than just politicking. It is about his legacy.
And so far it appears Rumsfeld will be leaving behind a tarnished legacy. His failed war doctrine is to be found in the way he handled the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless, Rumsfeld did not change strategy. Instead, neo-conservatives supported his belief that heavy-handed and bloody airpower, used in conjunction with limited U.S. forces, would “shock and awe” an opposing force into submission.
In the case of Iraq, Rumsfeld believed that smaller forces and devastating bombing raids would do the job quickly, thrilling the Iraqi civilian population. The war began with 50 “shock and awe” attacks aimed at murdering the Iraqi leadership.
However, when that failed to do the trick, many innocent civilians were killed in the wake.
The resulting chaos in the two countries now seems to have taken Rumsfeld by surprise. In Iraq, for example, the guerrilla fighters have had great success, operating with impunity around the country. The same goes for Afghanistan.
Despite overwhelming evidence of failed policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Bush continues to defend Rumsfeld and his doctrine and expects the American people to “stay the course.” In recent weeks, details have emerged that some members of the British cabinet thought that President Bush gave Rumsfeld too much power. That revelation came from advance publicity about the planned publication of diaries by former British Home Secretary David Blunkett.
According to Blunkett, Rumsfeld was singled out for a lot of criticism by cabinet members with the exception of Prime Minster Tony Blair. He was put under immense pressure during the invasion and snapped during a cabinet meeting when Blunkett told him the United States and Britain were fighting a hi-tech war without a modern strategy to support it.
Blunkett claims that Bush’s inner circle was deeply divided about war strategy. That may well be true because Secretary of State Colin Powell’s doctrine of overwhelming force was sacrificed for Rumsfeld’s belief in the use of light ground forces, plenty of bombs and hi-tech control and command systems, which cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars but have proven themselves useless against a small but determined group of Iraqi and Afghan guerrilla fighters.
(Issue #43, October 23, 2006)
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